Buddy can you spare a trillion? The EU budget review

Way past bedtime on 17th December 2005, frazzled European leaders decided how to spend just under one trillion Euro. They set the EU's budget framework from 2007 to 2013 - and committed €947 billion or just over 1% of EU GDP over the period. The chart shows the breakdown of the 2007 budget by major theme - dominated as ever by agricultural subsidies and 'regional' policy or what is now known as 'cohesion' policy (spending in poorer regions of the EU, supposedly to bring them closer to the EU average).

The full budget from 2007-13 is in this spreadsheet [XLS] [source data]. You can also look at the 2007 Budget at a glance or expenditure by programme to see how the Commission describes it, and at an even more detailed material in the EU Official Journal if you want to risk insanity and blindness. Probably the best guide to how the budget is intended to be used is still the Commission's 2004 proposal, Building our common future.
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Have a referendum... on EU membership, not the treaty

Am I alone in finding the phoney war over the EU treaty unbelievably annoying? I feel as though I'm caught in the midst of an Olympic synchronised lying event, where just about everyone is saying the opposite of what they think for reasons different to those they give. The government doesn't want a referendum because it will probably lose, so it is saying the treaty is very different to the constitution and therefore its earlier promise of a referendum no longer applies. The opponents say the treaty is the same as the constitution so the promise of a referendum must apply. But they want that because they think people will over-react to any vote on Europe and this will help to sink the EU or, amongst the most deranged, lead to our withdrawal. They are hoping to make political capital (or plain mischief) from Britain's deep Euroscepticism - see chart [YouGov polling data]. No side is bothering to make a thoughtful case for the treaty, or against it.

The real situation, at least as I see it, is as follows:

1. Main purpose: the treaty provides some much needed administrative streamlining and better 'machinery of government'. This should improve the quality of EU decision-making and accountability (a bit).It also does a few things that will help Europe in a globalising world. [see text / documentation / BBC guide / Guardian Q&A]

2. Transfer of power to EU; the treaty does pool some sovereignty (or transfer power) in some issues (many trivial, some important)... this happens because we give up some vetoes (unanimous voting) for majority voting. But the sceptics always think of loss of vetoes as a loss of power, and vetoes as 'surrendered'. This is wrong - often a move to majority voting means other countries can't block what we want to achieve through the EU. People think the power goes to 'Brussels', but it largely remains with the Council of Ministers. When we need to express power collectively (eg. in international relations or development) the removal of vetoes can give us more power.

3. It's the same. The amending treaty is little different to the constitution in its effect, though its form is completely different. The amending treaty is tediously defined as a series of textual amendments to the existing treaties (Rome, Maastricht, Nice etc), whereas one of the great benefits of the constitution was a consolidation into a single text, albeit a long and complicated text. In claiming it is different, the government is focussing on its form, not its function, and is being very disingenuous. The main difference is the dropping of a few symbols like the anthem etc. See European scrutiny committee report, especially Annex 1 (p.25) and BBC reporting of this for comparison.

4. Some of it is stupid and unnecessary. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is ridiculous and counter-productive (and UK has an opt-out of dubious resilience). The danger of defining too many rights that are not profound or deeply supported in society, is that the currency of rights becomes devalued. There is something troubling about a document that includes the rights to 'access to free placement services', 'right to social security' and 'family protection' in the same charter than protects the right to life and freedom from torture. It even seems to ban school kids having a Saturday job. We should stick with the European Convention on Human Rights, which deals with the rights that really matter, and make sure that really works.

5. There is no case for a referendum on the treaty (and there wasn't on the constitution). We are, rightly, sparing in what we ask people to vote on - we leave scrutiny of difficult legislation to elected representatives, and only bother people when the changes are fundamental - ie. in/out of EU, devolution, regional assemblies etc. The issues at stake here are no more significant than those considered in domestic bills and trusted to parliament. And many domestic bills shift more powers around than this treaty - eg. the recent terrorism legislation. We know people are hugely confused or wilfully ignorant about the EU and this treaty - see for example polling for the Sunday Times, from 2004 - which shows people believe that the EU has more power than it has and would take more than it will, and so it is unclear on what understanding people would base their answers to the simple question about whether you support the treaty. One might argue that a referendum will force politicians to explain the treaty properly. I strongly believe that any referendum should present people with strong clear choices that they can understand. The difference between 'yes' and 'no' for this treaty is very obtuse - to the point where few involved can actually explain it.

6. EU is an elite programme that needs a new mandate. The development of the European Union has long been a programme of the political and business elites - and current treaty is no exception. Ordinary folk have usually misread it from one extreme or another - either as a happy-clappy fellowship of nations with liberal values or as a sinister plot by power-crazed bureaucrats. It is neither. the EU provides cover for politicians to do what they know or believe to be right, but often find hard to sell to their electorates. That cannot continue for two reasons: firstly the EU institutions don't really like or understand the basic principles of 'subsidiarity', 'proportionality' and 'conferral' that supposedly underpin the balance of powers between member states and the EU. As a result it does too much, does it badly and does it with poor democratic accountability. It is right to be Euro-sceptic about this. Secondly, we need the EU to do more outward-looking things - be a global player on behalf of the member states... and that will require more pooling of sovereignty. This is where the EU needs more support and less scepticism. So big changes are needed, and the public will have to understand them and want them. In other words, the EU needs a renewed popular mandate based on what it now is and should become. The mandate secured in 1975 for continued membership of the 'Common Market' has run out.

7. Have a meaningful referendum in the next parliament. I think at some point the EU will have to stop being an elite programme and be respected and accepted by the wider public - a point we are far away from now - or we leave it. To do this, we need a proper vision and debate about the future of the EU, both in the UK and in the EU itself. The real future of the EU is obscured in the treaty and there is virtually no debate about what it will be doing in even 10 years (though the budget review might help with that). But this is what we should be discussing - not the cycle of Commission appointments or voting system for comitology or other arcane details. A referendum would present people with a stark in/out choice and force us all to examine what we want the EU for and where it is going.

To summarise: the treaty has virtually the same effect as the constitution and is a useful improvement to the EU. But it is not of such consequence that it justifies a referendum (and it never did). However, the popular mandate for EU programme from the British people has expired and needs to be regained. Legitimate scepticism and a bold outward-looking vision need to face down Euro-phobia and the globalisation-denial of the Little Englanders. I think the best strategy for the government would be for parliament to decide on the treaty in 2008, but for the government to promise a referendum on EU membership for the next parliament - and then present a vision and make the case.

Other political parties could declare for a referendum or even for leaving the EU in their election manifesto. Europe would be a central issue at the next election. It's about time it was taken seriously - the last time it was an election issue, it was William Hague pledging to 'save the pound'.

And that was quite enough of that sort of thing.
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Useless scientific advice

I lifted the box to the left from the Wall Street Journal, a newspaper that has to be clear, concise and to the point in its communications or its busy and clever readers buy the Financial Times instead. If only the European Commission could choose where it gets its scientific advice, and the scientists involved felt some pressure to be clear, concise and to the point. Alas, I came to read the preliminary report of the European Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks on the subject of smokeless tobacco [PDF]. This will inform European public health policy, and if it was barely competent, it would lead to the lifting of the absurd policy of banning 'oral tobacco' (smokeless tobacco) in the EU outside Sweden. However, despite hundreds of citations and pages of data, the report doggedly conceals, obfuscates and evades the most obvious and important conclusions.

My response to the Committee: Suffice to say, I have been driven to pen a response. This required two components: an on-line response to constrained questions set by the Committee (see here), and a fuller response (see here) covering the broader failings of the work.

Not stating the obvious, focussing on the obscure. Because smokeless tobacco is many times less hazardous than smoking and can substitute for smoking, there are potential large public health gains to be had (or more likely lost, if the stuff continues to be banned). Sweden has the highest rates of smokeless tobacco use and lowest rates of tobacco-related cancer, respiratory and cardiovascular disease. Instead we ban the product and prevent other countries benefiting in this way. You would have expected these insights to form the core of the assessment. I really don't know why they are avoiding this: I can only assume someone involved thinks they are duty-bound to ensure these tobacco products stay banned on the ultra-naive basis that banning something harmful must be progress. But how does distortion and evasion help protect anyone? Apparently, several of the external experts are fed up, perhaps to the point of a walk-out, with the clear bias and manipulation in the drafting of the report's conclusions. The most important part of any scientific assessment is the framing of the issues - my initial memo to the Committee in January 2006 addressed this. As I had expected, it was roundly ignored but I think this now accounts for the problems.

The report actually does quite a good job of surveying the literature, but it is marred by misinterpretation and inappropriate conclusions drawn from the evidence. Glaring and important truths are ignored or sidelined (er, the very low levels of disease in Sweden hardly features) and great effort is expended on trivial detail - others more expert than me will no doubt tear its flawed inferences apart. But I'll highlight three major failings here that I think transcend the tobacco / public health issues:

1. Communicating risk. The report discusses at great length whether the use of smokeless tobacco is hazardous and addictive. It is. Everyone knows it is. But risk is only interesting if quantified in some way and set in context. Bacon is hazardous to health and coffee addictive. What is missing in this report is some sort of spectrum of risk - with common consumer risks at one end (eating meat), medicinal nicotine, smokeless tobacco - in all its various forms, smoking, drinking hemlock etc. That way, we would know how much to worry about a few extra people using smokeless tobacco that would otherwise have remained tobacco-free, compared to how much we might hope to gain if other people used smokeless tobacco instead of smoking. In fact, the risks of smokeless tobacco use vary markedly between products - but this range is compressed into one end of the spectrum that has combustible tobacco products clustered at the other end.

2. Communicating knowledge in conditions of uncertainty. Whether lazy or manipulative, scientists are often very poor at dealing with uncertainty - saying what is known, even if it is not known beyond reasonable doubt. There is a tendency to say 'no evidence' when what they really mean is that there are no randomised controlled trials showing significant results at greater than 95% confidence. But this is just an arbitrary, if widely used, convention in medical literature. In policy work, insights based on the balance of probabilities are often more important and a good scientific assessment will help policy makers through the difficulties of understanding knowledge where there is not high certainty. In trying to find a way of putting this to the Committee I came across the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidance notes to lead authors on addressing uncertainties, which I think is an excellent guide and should be required reading for anyone working at the science-policy interface.

3. Burden of proof. Who should be doing the proving and what are the hypotheses? I think there is an in-built bias in so-called evidence-based policy making that favours the status quo. The problem is that high evidential hurdles are set as a pre-condition to justifying doing something new, but the case for carrying on with the current approach may not even be scrutinised and most probably questions never asked. The right way is to assess all the options including staying with the status quo taking a balance of probabilities approach. The ban on smokeless tobacco is an extreme case, but amazingly no-one seems to think it is important to justify the partial ban on smokeless tobacco in the EU - a bizarre intervention, and utterly without precedent, to ban a much less hazardous product variant than the market leader, in this case cigarettes.

One more small reason to despair at the European Union - to me, a completely vital institution in a globalising world. But it does too much of the wrong things, does too many things incompetently that it should do well, and does not do enough of what it really needs to do. A subject I'll be returning to....! ... continues. Read full post.

Escaping the reckless EU renewables targets

The Guardian exploded with indignation this week [Revealed: cover up plan on energy target; leader; letters], at the discovery of a leaked government memo discussing how the UK might wriggle out of a European Union renewables target - to reach 20% of EU energy consumption from renewables by 2020. In fact, the real story is different and more worrying than the Guardian has it. The real problem is how this target ever was agreed in the first place and the negative consequences for climate change that will flow from it. It might seem counter-intuitive to see a highly 'ambitious' renewables target that way, but I think these targets an own-goal that will discredit the EU, cause negotiating sclerosis, distract from more important objectives, and fail to deliver what would in any case have been the wrong approach, whilst missing renewables targets for 2010 by miles. I think this is bad policy and the civil servants are right to be looking for a way out, so let me explain why...
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Europe's renewables target

Just looking at the text of the EU Council Presidency Conclusions from 9 March. The bit about renewables is to the left with some scrawl from me. I've already argued that this is a mad way to do policy [Renewables - why is the EU involved?] - it would be more sensible just to set the carbon targets and rigorously enforce those, letting each country decide how to meet its target.

Of course, the real problem now is divvying up the overall 20% target between member states - so-called burden sharing. And I predict chaos! The Council has hinted here at how it will decide - based on existing renewables share and sneakily introducing consideration of nuclear and carbon capture and storage - one assumes giving those member states that have gone down those roads a lower share of the renewables target. But just imagine the problems... the chart below from EU ObservER and its report: State of renewable energies in Europe, 2006 shows the 2005 share of renewable in primary energy (the 2020 target for this now being 20% for the EU as a whole) - click graph to expand.

As we aspire to more than triple renewables share of primary energy (from 6.3% in 2005 to 20% in 2020) and keep up with growth (oh, despite the 20% energy efficiency improvement), can anyone figure out how to do the sharing? Take into account nuclear share, CCS share, existing renewables share (a 100 fold range) - but watch out for countries with big shares based on large hydro because that is limited by available sites, and if nuclear and CCS are a factor, then why not CHP and energy efficiency? And what if there is less incineration, but more recycling, recovery and reuse?

Probably the best comment on this has come from Peter Sutherland, Chairman of BP, interviewed by the Financial Times [article]:

“What we don’t want to see is the agreement at the council turning into Lisbon agenda mark two in terms of massive aspiration and failed delivery,” the BP chairman told the Financial Times in an interview, referring to a 2000 summit that resolved to make the EU the world’s most dynamic economy by 2010.

“Politicians are always quite happy to give promises that affect successors.” Britain’s Tony Blair and France’s Jacques Chirac were crucial to getting a climate change deal but both would be leaving office in months.

Sorry to be so cynical - but I think this sort of EU posturing invites it. ... continues. Read full post.

Renewable energy targets - why is the European Union involved?

The European Union has been busy setting out ambitious ideas for energy and climate policy - see Energy for a Changing World, and the climate change and energy announcements made in January. But is it trying to do too much of the wrong thing in trying to determine member states' approach to renewables? I think so...

There are three main problems... first, the EU is leaping ahead to set ambitious (perhaps reckless) targets for 2020 when it is far from likely that it will make its 2010 targets; second, it's not obvious if these targets would produce desirable outcomes even if they were achieved; and third, why should targets be set at EU level at all? The EU should let member states decide how to meet their Kyoto objectives - the approach fails on subsidiarity grounds. Let's look at the targets in more detail...

EU Council proposes 'tough' new targets for renewables
The EU's Council of Energy Ministers met on 15th February to finalise a package of energy policy reforms [see communiqué], including policy and targets for renewables to 2020. This will be taken for final agreement to the spring European Council on 8-9 March 2007. The relevant wording on renewables [on p.9 and here] covers two main objectives...

1. Overall target - renewables as a proportion of EU energy consumption
The Council endorsed overall EU target for renewables to reach 20% of the EU's overall energy consumption by 2020, with a process to divide this between the member states but with member state discretion to determine which renewable technologies to use to meet its target. This builds on the existing directive 2001/77/EC which sets an 'indicative' target of 12% primary energy and 22% of electricity from renewables by 2010 (for the EU-27 this has become 21%).

It should be noted that EU renewables share of energy consumption increased from 5% to 6% in between 1993 and 2004 - so the targets represent dramatic sustained increases [Eurostat data for upper chart]. Increasing the share of renewables, means increasing renewable energy faster than the growth in consumption - so those steep slopes on the chart .

It should also be understood that EU's renewable energy is dominated by hydro power - 75% of EU renewable electricity in 2004 - based on long-standing schemes in the Alps, Pyrenees and other mountainous areas that are now highly prized and protected. Meeting the 2010 target to have 21% electricity requires a massive increase in the 25% that is not the installed hydro base [Eurostat data for lower chart]. The Commission's communication [COM (2006) 849] tries to put a happy face on it (literally), but it is clear we are well off track for meeting the 2010 target.

As the EurObserv'Er Barometer puts it in its 2006 assessment: the important European objectives, the 22% of the Directive on renewable source electricity and the 12% of primary energy of the White Paper, shall be far from being reached in 2010. [report PDF]

2. Biofuels target - a leap into the dark...
The Council's 15 Feb communication endorses a binding target for biofuels to reach 10% of transportation fuels for each member state by 2020 - subject to some sustainability considerations and availability of "second generation biofuels". This builds on the existing directive 2003/30/EC, which requires each member state to have 5.75% of its petrol and diesel by energy content from biofuels by the end of 2010 (actually each member state is to have an 'indicative target' and this is a 'reference value' for it - typical EU fudge for saying this is kind of voluntary.) This requires lift off from an even lower base than renewables as a whole [Eurostat data]. There is the added complexity with biofuels of the variable and uncertain carbon reduction, which depends on how and where it is produced, the land take and competition with food, and impacts on water, soil, and biodiversity - and high inputs of fertilizer and pesticides. I hope to return to that shortly... I'm not even convinced that a big move into biofuels is a good idea - though we mustn't lightly rule out options for tackling climate change.

What's to be done?
Let me suggest three things:

a. Actions not words. Focus on meeting (or adjusting) targets for 2010 before dramatically extending them for 2020. And don't set hard targets (ie. for biofuels) for 2020 until lessons have been learnt from the experience to 2010. It's as though ministers want to forget the things they are actually accountable for delivering and focus discussion and political capital on things comfortably far off.

b. Back out of renewables policy. Don't try to run all of energy policy at the EU level - especially not renewables, which are usually highly local in implementation and their impacts on the environment. It is not good policy to have set objectives (like the Kyoto targets) and then to be prescriptive about how to meet them - what if a member state could meet its targets more cost-effectively (renewables are generally and expensive way of reducing carbon at present)? What if a member state doesn't agree with the industrial policy idea of subsidising renewables to build up the business - or thinks it will just suck in exports? Should the EU be requiring member states to act together in this, eve though it isn't necessary. I can see a case for the EU insisting on particular 'policies and measures' when it looks like particular countries are going to miss their CO2 targets as some sort of 'remedial treatment', but not unless.

c. Do things that the only the EU can do or does best. I think it would be better if the EU stuck to policymaking on environmental energy policy issues where it involvement is critical - and that is a lot:

• Achieving an ambitious post-2012 Kyoto agreement in which EU leadership is catalytic
  
• Engaging with the US, Russia and major developing countries on behalf of the 27 member states
  
• Realising a fair burden-sharing regime between members states of an ambitious Kyoto commitment
• Making the emissions trading system work better
  
• Tackling 'stateless' aviation and maritime emissions
• Setting high emissions standards for traded products in the single market - vehicles, appliances, industrial equipment
• Ensuring high quality consistent consumer information is available across the EU
• Regulatory requirements for carbon capture and storage on new power plant
• Converting the European Investment Bank into an investor in limiting and adapting to climate change and strengthening energy security
• A bunch of things about competition, liberalisation and markets that underpin energy security
  

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Climate change - what the IPCC tells us (and doesn't)

In many ways the IPCC 4th Assessment Report (known by aficionados as 'AR4') from the physical science working group confirms much we had already taken to be established beyond reasonable doubt (see summary). A huge impulse (greenhouse gas increases) is being applied to a complex physical system (atmosphere, oceans and carbon cycle) and modellers are struggling through the task of working out how it will respond... (see charts to the left). To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld's famous saying, the exercise involves narrowing quantitative uncertainties in the known-knowns, giving qualitative warnings about the known-unknowns and admitting we should still be worried the unknown-unknowns. And worth remembering, Rumsfeld also concluded, albeit in a different context: "it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones."

Suggestions that sea level rise might be lower than previously thought were met with glee in traditionally sceptical quarters... (see: UN downgrades man's impact on the climate in the Telegraph) but these interpretations are confused with a narrowing of the range of uncertainty around a central estimate that is close to the Third Assessment Report in 2001. There are better graphics, clearer communications, new insights, finer resolutions etc - but basically not much different from a policy point of view. I think that may be because the emphasis has been on nailing the so-called sceptics - and therefore on delivering a 'shock and awe' response to tiresomely self-interested sceptics' challenges to conclusions already drawn and largely accepted for policymaking purposes. But I think this might be a bad thing and the IPCC is letting us down...

Does the IPCC do a disservice by being this cautious?
The IPCC provides a gold standard and very high level of assurance - it also has to negotiate text between scientist delegations from countries that may be hostile to a completely truthful exposition. But is there a danger of fighting the last war, and failing to really convey threats? Does this give an implicit victory to the sceptics - who are paid to slow down progress and sow confusion and doubt? Could all this caution and risk-aversion seem like 'good science' but actually have the perverse effect of raising the real risks because they find it harder to include coverage of the known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns? New Scientist magazine suggested this is the case:

The peer review process was so rigorous that research deemed controversial, not fully quantified or not yet incorporated into climate models was excluded. The benefit - that there is now little room left for the sceptics - comes at what many see as a dangerous cost: many legitimate findings have been frozen out. [See: What the IPCC didn't tell us]

The New Scientist article, which is subtitled "If the official verdict on climate change seems bad enough, the real story looks far worse", argues that concern about sceptics and its own status has biased the IPCC in favour of what can be modelled with confidence, or as I would put it, measuring Rumsfeld's 'known-knowns'. In contrast, an excellent conference held in Exeter in 2005 was titled "Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change" and had leading scientists investigate what 'Dangerous Climate Change' would mean and what it would take to cause it. That gives a far more worrying picture - yet much of its substance is ignored or only alluded to in AR4 summary... the modelling has primacy. My concern is that excessive hedging and gold-plating in scientific advice is a form of 'reckless caution' because it leaves decision-makers with an overly sanguine prognosis.

There are nevertheless some very troubling passages in the IPCC summary.

1. All of it
Even just taking the science as established and summarised in AR4 and assuming that is all that is known and all that will ever happen, the prognosis is still very bleak.

2. Sea level rise
AR4 points out that much higher sea levels have been associated with warmer temperatures in the past...

Global average sea level in the last interglacial period (about 125,000 years ago) was likely 4 to 6 m higher than during the 20th century, mainly due to the retreat of polar ice. Ice core data indicate that average polar temperatures at that time were 3 to 5°C higher than present, because of differences in the Earth’s orbit. The Greenland ice sheet and other Arctic ice fields likely contributed no more than 4 m of the observed sea level rise. There may also have been a contribution from Antarctica.

But the range of global average temperature increases projected for the 21st Century is up to 6.4 degrees (for the most fossil fuel intensive) emissions and many highly plausible business as usual scenarios would increase temperatures by 3-5 degrees (see Table SPM3 in the summary p.13) view table

But note that projections for polar warming are higher (especially for the north ) than for the global average - for example, scenario A2 gives a global average warming of 3.4 degrees C by the end of the century, but more than 6 degrees in the polar north. See map (left) from Figure SPM-6 in the summary)
This probably means that temperature rises in the 21st Century will cause a large commitment to sea-level rise - and what remains uncertain is how fast that will occur. The IPCC concedes that this isn't properly understood or included in current models:

Dynamical processes related to ice flow not included in current models but suggested by recent observations could increase the vulnerability of the ice sheets to warming, increasing future sea level rise. Understanding of these processes is limited and there is no consensus on their magnitude.

What if the processes are more rapid and the ice-sheets more vulnerable as suggested by recent observations? There is increasing evidence that the physical disintegration of ice sheets will happen more rapidly than thermal melting.

3. Temperature increases and carbon cycle feedback
Another area that was troubling to me was the discussion of the 'carbon cycle feedback' - that more carbon is retained in the atmosphere as it warms - and this isn't factored into models yet because of uncertainties. The report says this about it:

Climate carbon cycle coupling is expected to add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as the climate system warms, but the magnitude of this feedback is uncertain. This increases the uncertainty in the trajectory of carbon dioxide emissions required to achieve a particular stabilisation level of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. Based on current understanding of climate carbon cycle feedback, model studies suggest that to stabilise at 450 ppm carbon dioxide, could require that cumulative emissions over the 21st century be reduced from an average of approximately 670 GtC to approximately 490 GtC (Summary report p.17 edited here to remove ranges for ease of reading) 1 GtC is a billion tonnes of carbon world carbon emissions including land use changes were 8.6 GtC in 2000 or 11.2GtCe including all other greenhouse gases)

Yikes! that means 490 GtC is very low. And this is troubling, because 450ppm is a figure often used as a threshold for avoiding dangerous climate change (associated with a temperature rise of 2C). And achieving a 490 GtC (billion tonnes of carbon) budget for the 21st Century will be incredibly difficult. This is way below the minimum if the emissions scenarios used for modelling, and supposed to represent the range of plausible emissions trajectories.

The charts to the left are from the IPCC special report on emissions scenarios (with my annotations) - these give a range of emissions from 770 GtC to 2,540 GtC. They aren't predictions, but scenarios to help model possible future worlds. The B1 scenarios offer the lowest emissions pathways, and these are built on a 'storyline' of strong sustainable development and localism. The world economy is currently nothing like B1-world, nor is it heading there. So to get to 770 GtC would mean an emissions trajectory following the lower bound of the B2 scenarios as indicated in the bottom of the two charts above. To get to 490 GtC would require the area under the curve to be reduced by more than one quarter.

4. It is only "very likely" that humans are causing global warming - a win for the sceptics
Even if, as I suggested above, the aim of the report is to see off the sceptics, I fear the enterprise may have been lost in the drafting. The report uses a range of terms expressing confidence in its findings. The summary report p.4 footnote 6 says that 'very likely' means more than 90% confidence and 'extremely likely' means more than 95% confidence. The BBC set this out well in its overview of the summary report. The report states that

"Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations" (original emphasis)

If I was a climate sceptic I think that getting the IPCC to say that there is between a 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 chance that the entire intellectual edifice of man-made climate change is wrong is not a bad effort. That's a degree of uncertainty that cannot be found ANYWHERE in the scientific literature. It is plainly wrong and misleading, but because it is misleading on the side of doubt, they have somehow got away with it.

I gather the Chinese scientific delegation fought alongside the predictable Saudis to keep the 'likelihood' as low as possible. It's easy to see why the Saudis might do this, but much less obviously in even the short term interests of China, which would be hit hard by the impacts and has a good claim to demand action from developed countries with many times the emissions per capita.

5. Decoupling of science and politics
The scenarios modelled by the IPCC are very different to those under discussion in the politics and economics. A footnote (14) on page 10 of the summary report points out that the concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalent could be very high by the end of the 21st century:

14 [...] Approximate CO2 equivalent concentrations corresponding to the computed radiative forcing due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases and aerosols in 2100 ... for the SRES B1, A1T, B2, A1B, A2 and A1FI illustrative marker scenarios are about 600, 700, 800, 850, 1250 and 1550 ppm respectively.

So 600ppm CO2e is the minimum in the IPCC scenarios. This is not new news (and nor are the scenarios forecasts), but it does suggest that the debate on economics and policy may have become detached from the scientific modelling in some important respects - given that the SRES scenarios are supposed to cover the full range of plausible emissions trajectories.

The Stern Review debated at length about whether concentrations need to be stabilised at 450 ppm or 550 ppm CO2e - see Chapter 8 - The Challenge of Stabilisation Stern bases his estimate of the social cost of carbon ($US85/tonne CO2) on 550ppm - it would be higher if the expected concentration was higher.

The European Union's 10 January 2007 initiatives on climate change and energy have restated a goal of limiting warming to 2C over pre-industrial temperatures.

The EU's objective is to limit global average temperature increase to less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. This will limit the impacts of climate change and the likelihood of massive and irreversible disruptions of the global ecosystem. The Council has noted that this will require atmospheric concentrations of GHG to remain well below 550 ppmv CO2 eq. By stabilising long-term concentrations at around 450 ppmv CO2 eq. there is a 50 % chance of doing so [European Commission, Limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius - COM(2007)2].

But the IPPC showed that warming since pre-industrial times has been 0.76C and its projections for the lowest emissions scenario (B1) are a further 1.8C by 2090-2099 compared to today - with a range of 1.1 to 2.9 [view table].So it would only be possible to achieve the EU objective if the future warming was at the very low end of the possible ranges, for the lowest emissions scenario. But even this is not right... the atmosphere will continue to warm after the emissions stabilise or fall well into the 22nd century because of inertia in the system. In other words, it is extremely unlikely that warming will be kept to 2C, even if, in a triumph of hope over experience, we take measures that vastly exceed expectations.

Conclusions

• The AR4 reads to me too much like a rebuttal of the sceptics and attempt at language that cannot be challenged. That is not the same as the best scientific advice to governments. If the IPCC can do only the former (and I wouldn't want it to stop doing that), I think there is more scope for advice that is really intended to be the best possible account of the known-unknowns and best possible speculation on the unknown-unknowns - done if necessary outside the IPCC. Like the 'Dangerous Climate Change' conference, I mentioned earlier.
  
• I'm glad the world is waking up to climate change and the EU is pushing hard for target that matches the objective of the UNFCCC (see article 2) to "achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" - I'm also glad that Stern took this approach too. But I wonder if these are at all realistic, even if we are hyper-optimistic?
  
• I think we need IPCC developing and modelling emissions scenarios that fit interpretations of this objective - such as those produced by Stern and the EU. In some ways the modelling process needs inverting, so that an emissions budget or trajectory is the output of a model in which the impacts on the climate system are constrained to values that would be consistent with the UNFCCC objective.
  
• The EU could commission its own scientific advice on the required emissions trajectories to meet the environmental constraints (and probably constraints in the maximum rate of adjustment) that it has established in its flagship policy - the EU has a budget of €50.5 for science for 2007-13.
• I think the EU should also commission advice on the harder-to-quantify and difficult-to-model risks (like the Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change publication) and add an additional scientific voice to the IPCC. This would help to create some diversity in the sources and risk aversion of the scientific advice.
  
• We need to be more pessimistic in thinking about adaptation than the IPCC AR4 modelling would lead us to believe - to take account of those unknowns that don't make it into the models because they can't be quantified - though they may be very real and dangerous.
  
• I think we should separate our objectives for stabilisation (say 450-550ppm) from our reference scenario for planning for the impacts and adaptation & resilience (probably at least 750ppm). The latter should reflect the path we are actually on and be adjusted when and if we actually move to a lower emissions path.

PS. Worth a look: Caspar Henderson's Grains of Sand blog on all this - and his comments on this post. ... continues. Read full post.

The Eurovision vision contest

Terrific pamphlet by Tom Burke and Nick Mabey of E3G. Their Europe in the World publication is a vision for Europe painted on the broadest possible canvas - an inspiring call for Europe to cast off its paralysing anxieties and face the globalising world with confidence and purpose. This is about defining a European mission that is outward-looking, and aimed at playing the most fundamental role we expect from any state institution: providing security. But they have a broad definition of security, making the case for Europe as a key actor providing in energy security, climate security, water security and food security. They define success not in raw GDP terms (which remains the obsession of the EU's Lisbon Agenda and most leaders), but in terms of quality of life, health, security and well-being.

China and Europe to buddy up
The idea that the rising prosperity of China per se is somehow a threat to our prosperity is rightly dismissed as nonsense, with the real threat identified as the unsustainability of China's (and Europe's) style of growth. They advocate a grand strategic alliance between Europe and China to shift to a model of growth consistent with their wider definition of security and the use of soft-power and co-operation as the basis for international relations - drawing on the lessons of Europe's outstanding great success - the conversion of states at war to a peaceful single market and political co-operation in securing high standards of living and environmental protection.

Contract with the future
They also draw attention to the vast inter-generational plunder that is presently underway (through pensions, healthcare costs, climate change, demographics and so on) and call for a new social contract drawn between current generations and the future. This is an important observation and deserves much greater attention.

A pamphlet for the progressive sceptic?
I sometimes (pretentiously) describe myself as a 'progressive Eurosceptic' - believing that the EU tries to do too much of the wrong things (subsidising farmers, over-regulating the wrong things, fraud, juste retour politics) and not enough of what we really need it for (as an outward-looking world-wide champion of European values). So, it's great to have this vision - and good vision is in short supply in Europe, and certainly not embodied in the failed EU Constitution or the efforts of Europe's leaders to sell it. But finishing this pamphlet and then thinking how the EU really behaves was like enjoying a pleasant dream set in Tuscany only to wake up in a damp bedsit in Peckham. See, for example, the outcome of Europe's highest political summit, the European Council [Economist report /BBC / official conclusions]. The highest Google rank for a search on European + Commission + Vision for official documents returns a page on the future of e-government from 2001.

Democratic renewal so that leaders actually lead
The EU is a long way from realising the Burke-Mabey vision. Though they suggest welcome democratic reforms based on participative and deliberative techniques, I'm not sure that is the only or main problem. The problem is leadership. And why is there insufficient leadership? Because the leaders we have don't have to sell a vision for Europe or even have a vision. The electorates and politicians can join together to kick the EU and use it to blame for difficult but important measures or to duck responsibility for tough choices which can be positioned as 'made in Brussels'. When the EU does something we don't like (but might be good for us) who do we blame or force to justify it - when the 27-person Council of Ministers is responsible, no-one is. To his credit, Tony Blair did a good job on the vision thing in his speech to the European Parliament in 2005, but has struggled to translate words into deeds and presided over an unseemly haggle over the budget and enlargement - and through his Iraq adventure, has degraded his capacity to lead in Europe.

So I think the key is to arrange the affairs of Europe so that our leaders - the Blairs and Chiracs of the future - have to own the European project and take it to their people. One way would be to link the weighting each member state gets in qualified majority voting not to population, but to number of people voting in the European elections - thus incentivising domestic politicians to increase turnout.

Make real politics from real choices about Europe's future
Another would be a referendum on the future of Europe - but not couched as a 'yes' / 'no' vote on the rules of procedure needed for smooth running of the institutions (ie. the 'constitution') - who really cares about that? But on rival propositions for Europe's future (each of which could contain identical rules of procedure). If it has to be a binary choice, the real choice is an outward-looking/insular response to globalisation, not a yes/no to 6-month rotating presidencies. The government of each member state would be required to act consistently with the vision that its people voted for. If necessary, a two tier system could be more widely established so that member states could choose Europe-fort or Europe-leger - that's not such a big deal as it is sometimes held up to be... we have it for border security and monetary union, and it might facilitate enlargement by allowing accession to be a process of graduation.

Walk before you run, but in the right direction
Finally, I think Europe's leaders have to win confidence one battle at a time: stop the absurd double location of the parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg (if they can't do that, how can they shape a global pact with China?); complete the single market in services; bring Turkey in and make the case for enlargement; replace the CAP by shifting the funds into sustainable development; set up a real peace-keeping force to aid the UN and promote the 'responsibility to protect' principle; pool member-state development budgets into European budgets; rethink the European Investment Bank as an institution promoting stability and accession for countries outside the EU; have a long-standing president; find a new settlement with Russia... and so on.

E3G's pamphlet is a great contribution on Lewis Carroll's principle: "If you don't know where you are going, then any road will get you there".

But the other principle that comes to mind is from Lao-Tzu: "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step". ... continues. Read full post.

R&D sometimes necessary, but never sufficient, for innovation

A couple of interesting reports on R&D... firstly the DTI's R&D Scoreboard 2006, where clearly more is better - at least one assumes that's the purpose of creating lists and league tables ordered by the sums spent (see chart from the report showing the world's biggest R&D spenders). Note the big spenders are not necessarily who you would regard as the great innovators.

The second report is from the management consultants Booz Allen Hamilton... Its arresting title is: A Select Set of Companies Sustain Superior Financial Performance While Spending Less on R&D Than Their Competitors [release/report]... What it comes down to is that innovation drives business, but that R&D spend is only loosely correlated with innovation. Booz Allen reckons that 94 out of the 1,000 companies it surveyed are 'high leverage innovators' (ie. Google not Microsoft, Toyota not General Motors)- they have an innovation system rather than R&D spend.

All of this should give pause for thought... For example, the EU plans to spend €50.5 billion on R&D between 2007 and 2013. Will this be spent in a way that generates innovation? Almost certainly not - the dominant concern will be making sure each country gets its 'fair' share. We also know that high tech parts of the economy are quite small - Big Pharma is our biggest R&D spender, but accounts for just 0.62% of the economy compared to banking at 5.85% or retail at 5.73% [ONS- see table 1.51]... what does innovation mean for service industries? And why do we pay so much attention to counting how much is spent on R&D, and 'input' measure, when it poorly predicts for innovation and doesn't really tell us much about innovation in the service firms that form the basis of the so-called knowledge economy? Look at London - by far the highest economic activity in the country, but the second lowest level of R&D:GDP ratio after the North East [see Regional Trends]. London is powered by financial services, business services and creative industries - all competitive internationally and all innovating like mad... but how many of these declare an R&D budget on their accounts.
... continues. Read full post.

Sandwich jambon de pays

Now on holiday wandering about in the Pyrenees and enjoying the seemingly effortless routine cuisine of provincial France: Garbure, Cuisse de Canard, Tarte aux Myrtilles etc. How is that they do it so well, yet we in Britain do it so poorly? I don't mean a comparison with London's finest dining establishments, but the food you find in any cafe or bistro anywhere - France far outshines its English eqivalent (the only possible exception being the bacon sandwich, and scholars of porcine gastronomy are divided on that). I return to an earlier subject, the underperforming British consumer... I just think the French are born and brought up to expect fine tasting, delicious food made with excellent ingredients... which are duly supplied by farmers through local markets and turned into great food by cooks that care about their trade.

How much of this is down to the CAP, which is so aggressively defended by French farmers? Well I suspect not much, as the same system produces fields of barley and oil-seed rape in Britain and Britain's emerging farmers' market movement hardly relies on CAP payments at all. But just suppose that support for French farmers truly did underpin French regional gastronomy, would it be acceptable? One might even consider a 'cuisine' (as opposed to food) to be a public good, like a language or a mythology - and worth preserving at a cost greater than that which its immediate users are prepared to pay. In my view, support for French farmers might be justified under two conditions: first that the support is provided by the French taxpayer or food consumer - not by transfers between EU member states. Second, that the support is as far as possible non-trade distorting so that other countries are not forced to follow or introduce barriers to trade. This is the key to CAP reform in my opinion - let each country decide if, why and how to support its farming industry but in a way that doesn't require everyone else to do the same. ... continues. Read full post.

Vision for CAP reform - reduce the role of the EU

Obviously anyone would be annoyed by the ludicrous wine lake thing (below). So duly inspired, I decided to set out a vision for Commmon Agricultural Policy reform - based on devolution, sustainable development and sound economics.

Rather than do it here, I thought it would be interesting to post it on David Miliband's blog, as he was discussing CAP... So here it is. Wonder what he made of it?
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Wine lake - only Europe could produce something this insane

A surreal return to the public eye for the European Wine Lake [Guardian article]. I presumed this had gone in the 1980s along with that other great icon of European progress, the Butter Mountain. Amazingly, the EU subsidies for wine production in 2005 were €1269 million, of which €791m went to measures to prop up prices by restricting the supply. The system restricts supply mostly by distilling about 15% of European wine output into industrial alcohol or solvents (and no, it isn't then sold as Blue Nun...). European wine stocks now exceed one year of production, or about 20 billion litres - think of a lake 1Km wide, 2Km long and 10m deep. [more]

Much of the problem lies with uppity New World foreigners, who it seems are unfairly taking the market over by selling us affordable, attractively packaged, good quality wines. Apparently, basing their business on innovation and competition rather than protection and subsidy has made them more successful - and amazingly, they are growing rapidly and, horreur, Europe is shortly to become a net importer. You can sort of see it in the difference in the wine labels... !

The Commissioner, Mrs Fischer Boel, plans to end the funding for distilling excess capacity, and pay growers to tear up their vines instead [release]. The aim is to remove 400,000 hectares (12% of total) over a five-year period, paying farmers up to €2.4 billion to do this voluntarily. She said “This is a ridiculous way to use taxpayers’ money. We must spend our wine budget of around €1.2 billion to €1.3 billion per year more intelligently,”. As so often with top Eurocrats, the idea that there might be no case whatsoever to spend taxpayers' money and waste consumers' money on subsidising this industry or paying for its restructuring does not enter the argument.

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EU funding - warped and unaccountable

A visit to Wales reminded me how bad the EU budget can be. Everyone knows the EU spends a fortune on agriculture, but there are also large expenditures on 'structural funds'. These are monies that the EU pays for social or infrastructure investment in poor areas... sounds good? But it isn't... The trouble is UK taxpayers pay all this money into the budget in the first place, only to find it returned to the UK with EU strings attached, and without much democratic accountability for this 'tax and spend'. In round terms, we pay in about £8.4 billion and get back about £4.1 billion (2004-5). So anything coming from the EU to UK is basically UK taxpayers' money rebadged (often with a little blue flag so that the EU can claim credit)

Why mention Wales? Well it seems we get some money for flood protection schemes from the Structural Funds in Wales, much of which has 'Objective 1' status - ie. it is poor. But to get this, we have to demonstrate these schemes have "additionality" ie. they wouldn't be funded by the domestic flood defence programme. But we have a domestic investment appraisal system for flood defences that is designed to select the schemes that give the best value for money. So the consequences of funding through the EU, is that we have to find schemes that give worse value for money in order to qualify. So money is taken out of the UK, sent to Europe and returned to be spend on poorer quality investment, with the hapless taxpayer fleeced again by unaccountable Brussels!

The only wrinkle in this purple-faced polemic, is that the domestic system probably doesn't take enough account of deprivation and social impacts compared to reducing economic damage from floods, whereas that is the focus of EU funds. But that is an argument for changing the domestic investment apparaisal appraoch... ... continues. Read full post.

EU judgement on hospital reimbursement goes way too far

The European Court of justice has just found that the NHS must fund treatment on the continent if the NHS waiting time is deemd too long. The ruling on case of Yvonne Watts (see BBC) effectively creates a single European health service with open ended obligations and removal of one of the very necessary approaches to rationing health care.

Where do these entitlements actually come from? Unspoken in this is that hospital treatment is a call on the taxpayer that funds the NHS, who has right to insist on limits to his or her liability in respect of other people's illnesses. This helps to make that liability open-ended. I don't think ECJ judges should be determining the social contract implicit in the NHS in this way.
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